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ABSTRACT 
 
Constitutional drafters often look to foreign constitutional models, ideas, and texts for 
inspiration; many are explicit about their foreign borrowing. However, when implemented 
domestically, the meaning of borrowed elements often changes. Political scientists and 
scholars of comparative constitutional law have analyzed the transnational movement of 
constitutional ideas and norms, but the political processes through which the meaning of 
foreign provisions might be refashioned remain understudied. Socio-legal scholars have 
examined the “transplantation” and “translation” of laws and legal institutions, but they rarely 
scrutinize this process in the context of constitutions. Drawing on an examination of 
borrowed constitutional elements in four cases (Pakistan, Morocco, Egypt, Israel), this article 
builds on research in comparative politics, comparative constitutional law, and socio-legal 
studies to provide a nuanced picture of deliberate efforts to import “inclusive” constitutional 
provisions regarding religion-state relations while, at the same time, refashioning the 
meaning of those provisions in ways that “exclude” specific forms of religious, sectarian, 
doctrinal, or ideological diversity. Building on socio-legal studies regarding the translation of 
law, we argue that foreign constitutional elements embraced by politically embedded actors 
are often treated as “empty signifiers” with meanings that are deliberately transformed. 
Tracing the processes that lead political actors to engage foreign constitutional elements, 
even if they have no intention of transplanting their prior meaning, we highlight the need for 
detailed case studies to reveal both the international and the national dynamics that shape and 
re-shape the meaning of constitutions today. 
 
KEYWORDS: constitutions, constitution-making, constitutional borrowing, constitutional 
identity, Pakistan, Morocco, Egypt, Israel 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
Constitutional drafters frequently look to foreign constitutional models, ideas, and 
texts for inspiration; in fact they are often explicit about foreign transplants, publicly citing 
the external models that inspired them. As foreign constitutional elements travel, however, 
social scientists have paid relatively little attention to the domestic political dynamics that 
shape what comparative constitutional law experts call constitutional “borrowing.”1 With 
reference to non-constitutional elements, political scientists have developed useful resources 
for understanding the movement of legal and policy norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 
Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Goldbach, Brake, and Katzenstein 2013). Similarly, 
socio-legal scholars have examined the ways in which foreign laws and legal institutions 
interact with local cultures (Falk-Moore 1986; Lazarus-Black 1992; Comaroff 2006). The 
ways in which foreign constitutional provisions are imported and then politically refashioned, 
however, tend to remain understudied (for exceptions, see Skach 2005; Small 2005; Hirschl 
2014).  
 Bridging the gap between comparative constitutional law, political science, and law-
and-society scholarship, we focus on the politics of constitutional borrowing in the realm of 
religion-state relations. How do actors who participate in the formulation and interpretation 
of constitutional texts use foreign references to achieve their domestic political goals—
specifically, their “religious” or “secular” nation- or state-building goals? And, then, having 
arrived in their new context, how do foreign constitutional references interact with domestic 
political conditions, changing their meaning as they travel?  
 Our contribution foregrounds the importance of exploring, from a socio-legal and 
political rather than a textual or normative perspective, how imported constitutional 
influences are transformed at the level of practical meaning. Focusing on one area of 
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constitutional concern (religion-state relations) to facilitate focused comparison while, at the 
same time, drawing on four cases (Pakistan, Morocco, Egypt, and Israel), we offer a case-
centered account of constitutional borrowing and translation, paying close attention to the 
domestic political dynamics of constitutional meaning that scholars have tended to overlook. 
Our main argument is that broadly “inclusive” foreign constitutional references concerning 
religion (inclusive in the sense of recognizing the rights and liberties of diverse religious 
groups or ideological perspectives) are often embraced by politically embedded drafters who, 
at the same time, treat those references as “empty signifiers,” that is, words with politically 
significant but profoundly unstable meanings (Laclau 1996). We point to cases in which 
political actors treat those imported references as empty signifiers in ways that allow their 
meaning to be domestically manipulated and narrowed. 
 This article examines the work of constitutional borrowers (i.e. importers) and 
interpreters (translators) to advance current socio-legal debates in at least four ways. First, by 
drawing attention to cases outside of Europe and North America, we expand the horizons of 
prevailing socio-legal research in the field of comparative constitutional law. We show that 
borrowing in non-Western cases is not a passive process whereby constitutional exporters 
take the lead in promoting global “best practice” through activist or expert transmission 
networks (de Lisle 1999; Hans 2017). On the contrary, the non-Western importers we study 
actively select or invoke foreign models to suit their domestic political goals, resorting to 
Western as well as non-Western sources of borrowing. In this sense, we demonstrate how 
non-Western countries themselves generate constitutional ideas, provisions, and models from 
which others borrow, even as subsequent patterns of constitutional meaning prioritize the 
demands of domestic politics over external pressures or global trends.  
 We also move beyond those who treat borrowing from Western models, particularly 
in the realm of religion-state relations, as a source of expanding rights (Grim and Finke 2011). 
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Instead, we show how patterns of borrowing are often bound up with forms of national or 
constitutional “identity formation” that narrow the meaning of imported elements in response 
to domestic political demands (Jacobsohn 2010).  
 Second, by stressing the substantive translation of foreign constitutional elements 
rather than mere textual transplantation, we sidestep two poles in the existing literature on 
“global constitutionalism.” On the one hand, recalling Alan Watson’s (1974) work on direct 
textual transplants, we do not stress growing textual isomorphism or convergence among 
formal constitutional provisions (in many cases, convergence around a global liberal 
“model”) (see also Law 2008; Gardbaum 2013). At the same time, recalling a well-known 
response to Watson articulated by Pierre Legrand (1997, 2001), we do not highlight the 
essential “incommensurability” of specific constitutional traditions (insisting, for instance, 
that the meaning of a borrowed constitutional principle must unravel or disintegrate as it 
travels) (see also Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003; Osiatynski 2003; Arvind 2010; 
Goldsworthy 2002; Dixon and Posner 2010-11). Extending the work of socio-legal scholars 
like Ryken Grattet (Phillips and Grattet 2000; Grattet and Jenness 2005) and Lauren Edelman 
(1992; Edelman et al. 2011) as well as Toby Goldbach et al. (2013) to explicitly 
constitutional settings, we illuminate a less commonly studied middle part of this spectrum—
one in which constitutional provisions (even beyond liberal rights) are embraced even as the 
meaning of those borrowed provisions is later politically reconfigured.2  
 Third, we contribute to the comparative politics literature on religion-state relations 
with specific reference to comparative studies of religion and constitutionalism. Many of 
these studies are large-N quantitative or statistical studies that focus on the cross-national 
textual transfer of constitutional provisions dealing with religion in order to illuminate the 
historical, political, or institutional conditions under which a given textual formulation may 
or may not be adopted (Fox and Flores 2008; Ahmed and Ginsburg 2014). This work is 
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valuable, but it often misses what we see as a key target of new research on the politics of 
constitutional migration, namely, the movement of substantive ideas. Coding the frequency 
of a textual reference to “secularism,” for instance, may be less illuminating than specifying 
what the political actors who refer to “secularism” understand this important constitutional 
reference to mean—for example, in a secular United States, a secular France, or a secular 
Turkey, China, or India.  
 Lastly, we provide a substantive example of how qualitative research might 
complement our understanding of the trends revealed by “correlational” quantitative research 
on textual transfers. Specifically, we build on law-and-society scholarship in which a rich 
account of legal translation mechanisms shows how the meaning of imported legal elements 
is politically transformed within particular cases. In effect, we extend existing law-and-
society research to the translation of constitutional provisions and, in doing so, we 
supplement the work of Ryken Grattet, Lauren Edelman, and Toby Goldbach et al. with that 
of Ernesto Laclau (1985)—specifically, Laclau’s more explicitly political notion of “empty 
signifiers.” This allows us to stress the deeply contextualized political mechanisms that       
re-make the meaning of migrating constitutional models focused on religion-state relations.3  
 After a brief account of our analytical framework, we trace four different patterns of 
constitutional borrowing rooted in “empty signifiers” and, thus, the political drivers that 
underpin shifting forms of constitutional meaning. These include (a) modifications of 
meaning associated with direct “textual” transfers (Pakistan), (b) the deliberate 
transmogrification of imported “institutional models” (Morocco), (c) the politically inflected 
reinterpretation of foreign models via explicit “invocation” (without any transfer of text) 
(Egypt), and (d) the deliberate re-reading of overarching legal models “inherited” from an 
imperial past before being actively assimilated (Israel). In each case study, relatively 
“inclusive” foreign constitutional provisions concerning religion-state relations are actively 
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embraced but, owing to majoritarian or authoritarian political pressures, they are also recast 
in explicitly “exclusionary” ways. We conclude with a discussion of how our four patterns of 
constitutional borrowing might be more broadly generalizable. 
 
Analytical Framework I: From Text to Meaning 
 
Comparative constitutional lawyers have long examined the travel of constitutional 
ideas across national borders,4 and international relations scholars have also begun to study 
the diffusion of international constitutional norms (Skach 2005; Wiener 2014). However, 
much of this work has focused on the migration of ideas between judges and courts during 
moments of constitutional adjudication (Perju 2003, 2012). Emerging scholarship on the 
travel of constitutional models at the constitutional drafting stage has also tended to approach 
the issue from a strictly textual perspective, focusing on particular clauses that travel or the 
appearance of international-law provisions in domestic constitutional settings (Goderis and 
Versteeg 2014; Law 2016). We focus, by contrast, on politically inflected changes in the 
meaning of imported constitutional provisions both during and after their initial adoption. 
  As noted above, Alan Watson and Pierre Legrand disagreed about the ways in which 
laws travel, with Watson’s focus on direct textual transplants being criticized in terms of 
what Legrand called the “cultural embeddedness” of law.5 Legrand insisted that textual 
transfers typically “fail” owing to intersubjective breaks at the level of legal meaning. Watson 
and Legrand were interested in private rather than public or constitutional law. But, more 
recently, Toby Goldbach, Benjamin Brake, and Peter Katzenstein (2013) have noted that, 
while “public law is [considered] … more resistant [than private law] to being transplanted,” 
constitutional law has nevertheless emerged as “one of the most important areas of public-
law legal transplants” (146, 142n2). This observation, however, is buried deep in a footnote; 
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Goldbach et al. do not focus on constitutional law themselves (see also Langer 2004). Indeed, 
even when socio-legal scholars have shifted their focus beyond textual “transplantation” to 
consider the practice of legal “translation,” they have rarely discussed the politically inflected 
translation of imported constitutional provisions.6  
 We address this gap by highlighting the ways in which transnational constitutional 
borrowing and translation are complex processes closely tied to local political considerations. 
In doing so, we move beyond the work of legal-diffusion scholars like David John Frank, 
Bayliss J. Camp, and Steven A. Boutcher (2010), noting that, as a consequence of these 
political considerations, the global diffusion of specific constitutional provisions is often 
divorced from any strong convergence of legal meaning or practice.7 In fact we argue that 
domestic political actors often have clear motivations for invoking or importing foreign 
constitutional elements, even if they have no intention of faithfully transplanting the prior 
(“foreign”) meaning of those provisions within their own political context (Scheppele 2003).8  
 In this sense, our work returns to that of socio-legal scholars like Ryken Grattet and 
Lauren Edelman, even though these scholars do not focus on constitutional law themselves 
(Edelman and Suchman 1997, 499; Grattet and Jenness 2005, 893). Edelman, for instance, 
examines patterns of employer compliance with American civil rights law, noting that 
employers rarely accept or reject such laws but instead creatively or discursively adjust them 
(Edelman et al. 2011). Grattet, similarly, examines how the meaning of a particular statute is 
often transformed via discretionary patterns of decision-making within whole “fields” of 
social, organizational, legal, and political action (Phillips and Grattet 2000; Grattet and 
Jenness 2005). In fact, with Maximo Langer (2004), both Edelman and Grattet show how the 
practical meaning of a legal text is closely tied to work undertaken by deeply contextualized 
legal “translators.”  
 In the realm of comparative constitutional law, the question of borrowing is often 
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framed by references to global convergence or isomorphism—as demonstrated, for instance, 
in the “world polity” tradition or in Günter Frankenberg’s “IKEA” theory of global 
constitutional isomorphism (Beck, Drori, and Meyer 2012; Frankenberg 2010; also Waters 
2007; Law 2008; Gardbaum 2013).  Frankenberg’s model of constitutional migration, 
however, includes a middle stage of transfer in which constitutional concepts move from a 
particular local context to a global “IKEA center” before the (now “globalized”) idea is 
adopted in its new location. By contrast, our study does not track patterns of global 
isomorphism at the level of directly transferable meanings. We highlight, instead, the     
power of local political dynamics in shaping conceptual transfers. In fact the question with 
which Frankenberg ends his essay (how do constitutional transfers of meaning happen?) is 
the question with which we begin.   
 In this context our work returns, once again, to pathbreaking law-and-society 
scholarship on the relationship between sub-constitutional legal texts and situated forms of 
legal meaning. Specifically, we show how forms of legal ambiguity growing out of what 
Ryken Grattet and Valerie Jenness (2005) call a “surplus” of legal meaning (where the same 
text lends itself to several different meanings all at once) interact with particular social, 
institutional, and political contexts such that ostensibly common textual elements map onto 
very different forms of legal practice. Grattet and Jenness confine their attention to domestic 
contexts in which a surplus of meaning allows ordinary civil and criminal laws to be actively 
and substantively re-interpreted. 9 We highlight the politics underpinnings of foreign 
constitutional provisions, focusing on the politically sensitive issue of religion-state relations. 
 
Analytical Framework II: Introducing Empty Signifiers 
 
Combining the work of socio-legal scholars like Edelman, Grattet, Jenness, and Langer 
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with that of Ernesto Laclau, we stress the ways in which borrowed constitutional provisions, 
models, and ideas are also translated to reflect the explicitly political concerns of those who 
borrow them. Specifically, we argue that those seeking to grasp the dynamics of 
constitutional meaning must appreciate the politically malleable gap that semioticians often 
illuminate, between a linguistic “signifier” and what it actually “signifies” (that is, between a 
given term and its meaning). 
 Social theorists like Ferdinand de Saussure (1959) and Claude Levi-Strauss (1963) 
have noted that the link between a particular text/word/sound, on the one hand, and its 
meaning, on the other, is deeply contextualized within a network of conceptual distinctions 
prevailing in a particular time and place. Highlighting forms of political contingency in 
particular, Laclau’s (1996) notion of “empty signifiers” (alongside so-called “privileged” or 
“floating” signifiers) ties these insights to our own focus on the politically inflected meaning 
of borrowed constitutional provisions. Laclau’s concepts, we argue, help us clarify the ways 
in which “politics matter” during episodes of constitutional borrowing.  
 In Laclau’s theory, the meaning of a “privileged” signifier is relatively stable or, at 
least, widely regarded as stable. Liberal constitutionalists, for instance, often treat a term like 
“religion” as a privileged signifier when they assume that its meaning is broadly uncontested 
(thus overlooking the ways in which colonial or postcolonial regimes often struggle to locate 
the complexity of “customary” spiritual practices within the conceptual domain of 
“religion”).10 Those writing about global constitutional isomorphism often rely on similar 
assumptions regarding constitutional terms like “secularism”. Across multiple contexts, they 
treat the meaning of such terms as plain. 
 Laclau’s “floating” signifiers are terms that appear detached from the broader 
conceptual networks that might otherwise endow them with clear meanings: their conceptual 
location, and thus their meaning, are thus seen as irredeemably vague. Critical legal scholars 
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scrutinizing British colonial encounters with Hinduism, for instance, often describe 
references to “religion” in this context as a floating signifier given their profoundly unstable 
relationship with ancillary concepts like doctrine, clergy, or conscience.11 Similarly, scholars 
writing about “constitutional incommensurability” often treat terms like “religion” or 
“secularism” as floating signifiers because their ambiguous meanings are thought to render 
the stable transplantation of such concepts difficult or even impossible.  
 In this article, we draw on the work of Ernesto Laclau to highlight an intermediate 
position, focusing on what he calls “empty” signifiers or terms whose meaning is neither 
stable nor irredeemably vague but rather politically contested (see also Gallie 1955-56). We 
pay special attention to the ways in which historically and politically situated agents, drawing 
attention to a particular term (say, “secularism”), wrestle with its multiple meanings and, 
then, actively press for one—for example, French laïcité rather than Indian equal treatment—
as an explicitly political act. As Laclau (1996, 44) points out, highlighting the importance of 
interpretive agents in contexts framed, not merely by organizational discretion (Edelman; 
Grattet and Jenness) but also by explicit forms of political intervention during key historical 
junctures, the meaning of an empty signifier “only exists in the various forms in which it is 
actually realized,” that is, the forms in which key political actors produce it.  
 In this sense, the meaning of the borrowed constitutional concepts we examine is 
neither stable nor untraceable. Meanings are, instead, deliberately de-contextualized and, 
then, actively re-contextualized through the deliberate interventions of domestic political 
actors. This is, in effect, what Maximo Langer (2004, 33) describes as the “translation” of 
legal ideas owing, in part, to a political struggle “between different actors and groups within 
the target legal system over the meaning of the translated [text].” We examine this process of 
translation or “re-signification” in four cases involving the borrowing of constitutional 
provisions concerning religion-state relations. We demonstrate how borrowed texts, clauses, 
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concepts, or models are intentionally emptied of their prior content (“de-contextualized”) 
and, then, cast as “empty signifiers” before being filled up again by politically situated agents 
pressing for new forms of constitutional meaning (“re-contextualized”).  
 Before proceeding, it is important to note that drafters may borrow a foreign model or 
text they actively contest, engaging in the forms of re-signification we associate with empty 
signifiers, but then still choose to “re-signify” the borrowed language, provision, or norm 
with forms of content that are left deliberately vague (to preserve the possibility of more than 
one interpretation later on). This process involves two overlapping strategies at once: the 
adoption of an empty signifier and, then, the embrace of an incremental approach to 
determining its re-signification in the future (Bâli and Lerner, 2017). Still, the empty 
signifiers we examine are never completely meaningless: their meanings are simply produced 
within a particular context, with evidence of this playing out in competing assertions of 
constitutional meaning (e.g. “inclusionary” vs. “exclusionary” religion-state relations) in a 
particular time and place. 
 
Four Patterns of Borrowing, Empty Signifiers, and Religion-State Relations:  
Case Selection   
 
In what follows we examine four different ways in which constitutional actors, having 
borrowed or invoked foreign provisions, go on to re-make the practical meaning of those 
provisions in particular contexts. Through selected cases, we highlight specific modes of 
politicized borrowing focused on religion-state relations.  
 In choosing our four cases, we sought to challenge a number of common assumptions 
about transnational constitutional borrowing in the context of religion-state relations. For 
example, it is common to expect patterns of transnational borrowing in territories formerly 
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governed by external powers to originate in the traditions or practices of former rulers 
(Britain vis-à-vis Pakistan and Egypt; France vis-à-vis Morocco and Egypt; the Ottoman 
Empire vis-à-vis Israel and Egypt; and so on). The cases we have selected, however, reframe 
this conventional expectation. In Pakistan, for instance, we provide an account of borrowing 
rooted not in the constitutional traditions of Britain but rather in global networks of anti-
British (“home-rule”) activism extending from Ireland to India. As such, our cases partially 
decolonize the study of constitutions and the practice of constitutional borrowing, reaching 
beyond the colonial and postcolonial frameworks underpinning numerous studies of socio-
legal translation to include colonial and non-colonial (here, non-Western) sources of constit-
utional borrowing.  
 Beyond borrowed texts, it is also common to expect deliberate borrowing from 
secular republics (e.g. India, France, Turkey) or famously pluralist regimes like the post-
Tanzimat Ottoman Empire—itself influenced by post-Enlightenment models borrowed from 
Europe—to facilitate constitutional orders supporting and legitimating religious, sectarian, 
doctrinal, or ideological “inclusion.” But again, our cases have been chosen to challenge this 
common assumption. In each case, politically charged translations of constitutional elements 
from India (in Pakistan), from France (in Morocco), from Turkey (in Egypt), and from the 
Ottoman Empire (in Israel) push in the opposite direction. Rooted in political processes 
combining religious pluralism with domestic struggles to frame an independent constitutional 
identity, constitutional borrowing from secular contexts in these cases facilitated the 
“exclusion” of religious others.  
 This exclusionary trend might be expected to vary across different regime types, with 
civilian-democratic regimes adopting a more “inclusive” approach than military regimes, 
authoritarian regimes, or monarchies. Yet, again, our cases refute this assumption. In what 
follows, an “exclusionary” reading of imported constitutional provisions concerning religion-
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state relations cannot be traced to any particular regime type: the same exclusionary reading 
emerges in all four cases. In Pakistan and Israel, constitutional borrowing overlaps with 
popular bottom-up translations that feed exclusionary forms of majoritarian religious 
nationalism (Pakistani “Muslim” nationalism excluding a heterodox religious group known as 
the Ahmadiyya; Israeli “Jewish” nationalism marginalizing non-Jews and non-Orthodox 
Jews). In monarchical Morocco and authoritarian Egypt, the same exclusionary outcome 
emerges via top-down forms of authoritarian state-formation (Morocco’s Muslim king 
borrows from secular France whilst restricting electoral democracy; Egypt’s secular military 
references a “Turkish” constitutional model prevailing under Turkey’s Islamist Justice and 
Development Party [AKP] whilst constraining the electoral prospects of Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood). 
 In what follows, the case of Egyptian borrowing vis-à-vis “the Turkish model” also 
shows how what we call foreign “borrowing” (combining references to foreign constitutional 
elements with domestic political debates that alter the meaning of those elements) is not 
confined to a narrow account of direct textual transfers. Like the rejected (“negative”) 
constitutional models studied by Kim Scheppele (2003), we argue that cases of foreign 
invocation without any transfer of constitutional text also illuminate an important feature of 
transnatioal constitutional borrowing (see also Salam 2018, 3).12 Egypt’s public debate 
regarding religion-state relations, for instance, was repeatedly marked by rival invocations of 
the Turkish “model,” often by actors who selected very different aspects of that model to 
signal the (domestic) legitimacy of their own opposing political positions. The fact that 
Egyptian drafters later opted to avoid any direct textual transfers from Turkey does not 
diminish the power of the Turkish model as a borrowed constitutional “empty signifier.” On 
the contrary, the Turkish model was in fact borrowed and politically re-signified in ways that 
directly shaped the meaning of religion-state relations in Egypt's constitutional debates.  
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 The four patterns of constitutional transfer and re-signification illustrated by our case 
studies can be summarized, briefly, as follows.  
 Direct Textual Transfers. The first mode of borrowing refers to explicit and 
acknowledged textual transfers involving substantive religion-state provisions that travel from 
one country to another. In what follows we track provisions concerning religious freedom 
from Ireland, via India, to Pakistan. Owing to particular political demands in Pakistan, 
however, these provisions later changed their meaning from a concern for individual rights 
(including minority rights) to a much narrower focus on protecting the rights of majoritarian 
doctrinal groups. We focus on Pakistan but, in a comparative sense, this mode of borrowing 
followed by politically exclusionary re-signification can also be found, with reference to 
religious-freedom provisions, in Malaysia. Like Pakistan, Malaysia borrowed key elements of 
its constitutional religious-freedom provisions from India before reinterpreting those 
provisions to privilege the country’s Muslim majority (Moustafa 2018; Nelson 2019). 
 Imported Institutional Models. Our second mode of borrowing considers the deliberate 
transfer and politically situated reinterpretation of broad institutional forms or models. In this 
case, we note that Morocco’s constitutional drafters borrowed institutional forms of 
presidentialism from France’s secular and republican constitution while setting the stage for a 
more narrowly defined religious and political understanding of Morocco’s “Islamic” 
monarchy. We focus on patterns of constitutional borrowing and resignification in Morocco, 
but this mode of transnational borrowing can also be found—with reference to religion-state 
relations—in Iran’s post-revolutionary effort to flesh out the institutional parameters of its 
Guardian Council via nuanced references to France’s 1958 conseil constitutionnel (Arjomand 
2012, 158, 161) . 
 Invocations without Any Transfer of Text. In our third case study, we take up cases of 
constitutional borrowing that involve references to foreign constitutional models without any 
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transfer of text. As noted above, this pattern figured prominently in the diverse meanings 
associated with “the Turkish model” during post-Arab Spring constitution-making in Egypt. 
Still, invocations of the Turkish model (sometimes signifying greater participation by Islamist 
parties) did not result in a more “inclusive” space for the electoral participation of Islamist 
parties like Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Instead, the Brotherhood was deliberately excluded 
by post-uprising leaders like General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who reverted to an authoritarian 
model of governance that echoed countervailing invocations of the Turkish model as a 
constitutional system of military tutelage. This mode of transnational invocation and political 
re-signification (withoug any transfer of text) also exists outside of Egypt. In Pakistan, judges 
have invoked the Indian concept of an unwritten constitutional “basic structure”—which, in 
India, has been used to advance secular commitments—to defend, in Pakistan, a parliamentary 
form of government blended with Islamic provisions (Nelson 2018).  
 Assimilation of “Inherited” Models. Our final mode of borrowing involves the 
movement of constitutional empty signifiers in cases of entirely unwritten constitutions. This 
occurs whenever borrowed legal ideas become entrenched even as their specific meaning is 
changed through ordinary legislation. This was the case in Israel, where the Ottoman Millet 
system of pluralism in the realm of religious personal law was actively “re-signified” first via 
the British Mandate and then through ordinary post-independence legislation. Under the 
Ottoman Millet system, non-Muslim minorities enjoyed religious autonomy, especially with 
regard to family law. But, in independent Israel, this inherited system of legal pluralism 
served as a tool for the exclusion of marriage practices associated with non-Orthodox Jews 
and those not conforming to specific state-recognized faiths. Although passed as ordinary 
laws, these more narrowly defined quasi-constitutional arrangements have resisted change for 
decades.  
 Again, these four modes of borrowing are not exhaustive. Even in the domain of 
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religion-state relations, judges involved in forms of constitutional adjudication can also revert 
to meanings that resemble those prevailing in the countries from which key provisions were 
imported. And, of course, the work of empty signifiers can also unfold in more “inclusive” 
ways. Ireland’s approach to group-based religious freedoms, for instance, was originally 
borrowed from Poland and, constitutionally, both countries continue to recognize that each 
religious denomination is entitled to (a) “conduct independently its religious affairs” (Poland) 
or to (b) “manage its own affairs” (Ireland) (see Keogh 2007, 154, 389).  Even as Poland 
relies on this provision to prevent same-sex marriages for its Catholic (majority) citizens, 
however, Ireland has reinterpreted this borrowed provision in a more inclusive direction, 
moving beyond civil partnerships to prevent any form of marital discrimination vis-à-vis 
same-sex couples.  
 Drawing on archival materials and contemporary records prepared by those closely 
tied to key constitutional debates and relevant political events in Pakistan, Morocco, Egypt, 
and Israel, our research is rooted in primary source materials presented in English and, 
crucially, in Urdu, French, Arabic, Turkish, and Hebrew. From colonial records to 
Constituent Assembly debates to parliamentary transcripts and official government archives, 
we link archival data to personal memoirs and contemporary press coverage, bringing a 
detailed account of specific constitutional transfers together with an account of the political 
drivers that framed patterns of constitutional resignification later on. Combining primary 
sources with existing scholarship, we highlight the political circumstances underpinning an 
exclusionary reinterpretation of external constitutional provisions.  
 
Constitutional Provisions as Empty Signifiers: Religious Freedom from Ireland via India to 
Pakistan  
 The most direct form of constitutional borrowing involves constitutional drafters 
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importing explicit textual provisions from other countries. In 1922 Ireland’s Provisional 
Government published a book entitled Select Constitutions of the World with constitutions 
from the United States of Mexico, the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, and sixteen 
other countries to inform its constitutional drafters. Reflecting transnational networks rooted 
in anti-colonial activism, the book was republished in 1934 to assist India’s Constituent 
Assembly (CA). This book was also combined with a second volume entitled Constitutions of 
Eastern Countries (1951) and used by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Within Pakistan, 
these compendia set the stage for direct forms of borrowing—and, later, refashioning—foreign 
constitutional models (Nelson 2019).  
 Archival records from India and Pakistan reveal extensive borrowing focused on 
religion-state relations and, specifically, enumerated and enforceable rights pertaining to 
religious freedom. Judicial and parliamentary records, in turn, reveal the ways in which 
grassroots violence perpetrated by conservative religious groups like the Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-
Islam (Association of “Free” Muslims) informed mainstream constitutional debates in ways 
that later reconfigured prevailing forms of interpretation vis-à-vis Pakistan’s borrowed 
provisions. Briefly, grassroots violence inspired majoritarian notions of “Muslim 
nationalism” in which key state actors recast borrowed religious-freedom provisions in an 
increasingly exclusionary mold.  
 Between 1922 and 1937, constitutional reformers in Ireland built on post-WWI 
constitutions in Eastern Europe—specifically, Poland’s “March” Constitution (1921)—to 
balance the religious freedom of individuals with the freedom of majority and minority 
groups to “manage” their religious affairs (Keogh 2007, 154, 389). These provisions later 
traveled to India via transnational anti-colonial activists like Annie Besant, who lifted key 
provisions directly from the Constitution of the Irish Free State (1922) in her proto-
constitutional “Commonwealth of India Bill” (Besant 1926, 212). This Bill directly informed 
 
 
19 
Article 25 of India’s Constitution (1950) concerning individual religious freedom (Austin 
1966, 54-55). India’s CA (1946-49) also adopted a provision concerning the rights of 
religious groups (Article 26) from Ireland’s 1937 constitution. 
 The interim constitution unveiled by Pakistan’s first CA (1947-54) clearly revealed 
the influence of both Ireland and India.13 In the Irish Constitution, Article 8 (1922) and 
Article 44-2(1) (1937) noted that, with reference to individuals, “the free profession and 
practice of religion are, subject to public order, …guaranteed to every citizen.” India began 
with the phrase “subject to public order” before noting that all persons enjoy “the right freely 
to profess, practice, and propagate religion” (Article 25). And, finally, Pakistan followed suit, 
explaining that “the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion are guaranteed subject to 
public order […]” (Article 10).  
 The Irish Constitution of 1937 also stipulated that “[e]very religious denomination 
shall have the right to manage its own affairs” and to “own, acquire, and administer property, 
movable and immovable, … for religious and charitable purposes’ (Article 44-2(5)). India’s 
Constitution guaranteed that “every religious denomination … shall have the right … to 
manage its own affairs in matters of religion … and to administer [its] property in accordance 
with law” (Article 26). Pakistan again followed suit, noting that “every religious 
denomination … shall enjoy freedom in the management of its religious affairs including … 
the acquisition of movable and immovable property for that purpose” (Article 11).  
 Hindu members within Pakistan’s CA tried to delay a debate regarding fundamental 
rights (including religious freedom) until the Assembly’s Committee on Minority Rights had 
issued its final report. But their colleague Abdulla al-Mahmood deflected their concerns, 
stressing that Pakistan’s efforts to protect the rights of minority groups were already 
explicitly drawn from Hindu-majority India. “Clause 10 of our Fundamental Rights,” he 
noted, provided “the same thing but on a little wider scale than what has been provided in 
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Clause 35 [sic: 25]” of the Indian Constitution (CA Debates, 4 October 1950, 78).14  
 Inclusive efforts to accommodate Pakistan’s Hindus via borrowing from India, 
however, were not unlimited, as Pakistani Hindus failed to persuade their CA colleagues to 
reject two claims pushing towards a more exclusive, majoritarian, Muslim constitutional 
identity. The first claim emerged from right-wing religious activists affiliated with a group 
known as the Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam as well as lay Muslim ideologues associated with 
Pakistan’s Jama’at-e-Islami (Party of Islam). These activists insisted that, because Pakistan 
sought to construct an Islamic-democratic constitution, a “Muslim” head of state was 
essential. The second claim emerged from rival politicians within the ruling Muslim League, 
insisting that non-Muslims should be relegated to a separate “non-Muslim” electorate to 
prevent their electoral intervention as kingmakers in competitive races between Muslims. 15 
On their own, these provisions sought to demarcate a special place for “Muslims” in 
Pakistan’s Muslim-majority “Islamic democracy”; but, over time, they also set the stage for 
dramatic changes in the meaning of Pakistan’s imported Irish-cum-Indian constitutional 
provisions.  
 The key issue did not involve the religious freedom of non-Muslim Hindus. Rather, it 
involved a religious minority known as the Ahmadiyya whose pattern of religious self-
identification as “Muslim” was treated as a source of debate. Even before Pakistan’s interim 
constitution was unveiled in 1954, some of those demanding special Muslim rights and 
privileges (e.g. a Muslim presidency and a separate Muslim electorate) insisted that 
Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya should be relegated to Pakistan’s “non-Muslim” electorate owing to 
their departure from the orthodox view that Mohammad was the final prophet of God. (Some 
Ahmadiyya recognize a late-nineteenth-century religious reformer named Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad as a “prophet.”) These right-wing religious activists were excluded from the CA 
because, in 1946, they did not participate in the provincial elections that underpinned the 
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CA’s late-colonial formation.  
 Many of these activists, however, resorted to riots and violent pogroms to advance 
their exclusionary views. A particularly violent stretch in 1952-53 culminated in Pakistan’s 
first martial law—a spate of military intervention that inspired later efforts within Pakistan’s 
CA to shore up the power of parliament (Binder 1961, 259-96; Report of the Court of Inquiry 
1954; Choudhry 1963, 48).16 This focus on parliament, however, was offset in 1958 by a 
coup and more than ten years of military dictatorship. Shortly after the military announced 
national elections in 1970, however, Pakistan was plunged into a civil war. Culminating in 
the separation of East Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh (1971), this war led to the 
promulgation of Pakistan’s current constitution in 1973—a constitution in which the 
restoration of parliamentary power figured prominently alongside a special focus on the 
ostensibly unifying features of Pakistani “Muslim” nationalism. 
 Pakistan’s 1973 constitution retained all of the religious-freedom articles initially 
borrowed from Ireland (via India). At the same time, however, these articles were paired with 
two constitutional adjustments clarifying the terms of Pakistani Muslim nationalism. The first 
emerged in the Constitution of 1973 itself, requiring each new President and Prime Minister 
to swear an oath, not only that he or she was a Muslim, but to clarify, that there could be “no 
Prophet after [Mohammad].” The second emerged one year later, in Pakistan’s second 
constitutional amendment, wherein Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya were constitutionally redefined as 
“non-Muslims.”17 The logic underpinning these changes was simple: if “Muslims” were 
endowed with special rights and privileges, the state must be able to distinguish its Muslim 
from its non-Muslim citizens (Qasmi 2014, 195). To do this, parliament merely sought to 
clarify, via oaths and constitutional definitions, which groups should be legally defined as 
“non-Muslim.” 
 Even apart from this basic legal logic, however, the specific political calculations 
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underpinning these constitutional adjustments were important. Immediately after the approval 
of Pakistan’s new constitution in 1973, the same activists who had challenged the rights of 
the Ahmadiyya during the 1950s reasserted themselves in another round of violent skirmishes 
(Qasmi 2014, 175-77). Pakistan’s new Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1973-77) did not 
declare martial law. After ten years of military dictatorship, he turned to parliament and its 
power of constitutional amendment instead.18 Within this turn to parliament, however, the 
same activists stressed what they saw as the concerns of the country’s religious majority, 
claiming that, by identifying as “Muslims,” Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya actively diluted Muslim 
access to Muslim constitutional rights. Bhutto’s parliamentary majority did not reject this 
argument; facing rival coalitions tied to right-wing religious parties in two out of Pakistan’s 
four provinces (Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province), they simply coopted it. In 
effect, Bhutto agreed that Pakistan’s parliament was entitled to curtail, by way of 
constitutional amendments, what his Attorney General described as an Ahmadi “threat” of 
religious “false belonging”.19  
  Public officials facing yet another round of protests by the same right-wing activists 
later intervened to restrict the fundamental rights of Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya even further—this 
time under the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), who amended 
Pakistan’s Penal Code (§298) to prohibit the country’s Ahmadiyya from using ostensibly 
“Muslim” words like masjid (mosque) or azaan (call to prayer), describing any Ahmadi use 
of such words as a dangerously provocative form of “encroachment” on the special religious 
“property” of Muslims (Saeed 2011, 88). When this reading was taken up in a landmark 
Supreme Court case known as Zaheeruddin v the State (1993), the Court simply referenced 
Pakistan’s borrowed constitutional provisions. In particular, summarizing the decision, 
Ahmad Mahmood Khan (2003, 228) notes that, according to Pakistan’s Supreme Court, 
“Ahmadi religious practice[s], however peaceful, angered and offended the Sunni majority,” 
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so to preserve public order (Article 20), “Pakistan would … need to control [them].”  
 As such the state drew on Irish and Indian provisions protecting a right to religious 
freedom “subject to public order,” suggesting that formal legal restrictions on the 
fundamental rights of the Ahmadiyya were necessary to prevent any possibility of religious 
provocation, outrage, or “disorder” within the country’s Muslim majority. The specific 
language of Irish and Indian religious-freedom clauses was, in effect, emptied of its prior 
legal content and used to support an increasingly exclusionary reading in which Pakistan’s 
religious-cum-political majority actively reconfigured the meaning of Pakistan’s borrowed 
constitutional provisions.  
 
Constitutional Institutions as Empty Signifiers: French Constitutional Structures in the Service 
of Islamist Monarchy in Morocco  
 
Beyond this focus on the transfer of explicit constitutional clauses, a second type of 
borrowing in the realm of religion-state relations involves the unacknowledged adoption—
and, then, adaptation—of foreign constitutional ideas regarding state institutions. Morocco’s 
transfer of constitutional structures from the 1958 French Constitution offers one example. 
Moroccan political actors drew on institutional elements from a democratic and secular 
European republic to legitimate, even sacralize, their country’s Muslim monarchy. 
   Perhaps because of its non-elected monarchical head of state, or its habit of frequent 
top-down constitutional drafting, Morocco has rarely been the focus of comparative 
constitutional analysis.20 Yet, particularly when juxtaposed with other Arab constitutions, 
Morocco’s postcolonial documents (each approved by a popular referendum) show several 
noteworthy features—most obviously, a pattern of imbuing the country’s ruling monarchy 
with “Islamic” forms of legitimacy (the king is referred to by the caliphal title amir el-
mu’minin or “Commander of the Faithful”)—even as each constitution also references 
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minority cultural influences and a pluralized understanding of rights.  
 There are several accounts of this explicit effort to infuse Morocco’s leader with 
quasi-sacred status alongside a push to highlight the country’s religio-cultural pluralism 
(Waterbury 1970; Geertz 1971; Tozy 1999; Mednicoff 2017). Yet, there is also a rarely 
noticed facet of Morocco’s constitutional origins that may help to connect these ostensibly 
divergent substantive elements. Morocco’s constitutions contain similarities of both language 
and structure with the 1958 constitution that established the French Fifth Republic. This is no 
coincidence, given France’s colonial and postcolonial influence on Morocco and Hassan II’s 
close ties to France, French political culture, and French constitutional experts. 
 Within postcolonial Morocco, the evidence of actual constitutional borrowing from 
the country’s former French colonizer is strong, if circumstantial. A new king seeking to 
restore Moroccan political autonomy and establish his own authority after a vocal 
independence struggle would hardly be expected to admit that he had relied on French texts 
or advisors to compile his country’s first postcolonial constitution. Indeed, King Hassan II 
claimed that the constitution came from “his own hand.”21 Yet the 1962 Moroccan 
constitution included provisions very similar to those from the 1958 constitution in France. 
Specifically, the Moroccan document seemed to draw on French provisions for states of 
exception,22 the ruler’s ability to call a popular referendum (going over the heads of his 
elected parliament),23 and, in general, a comparatively high level of authority associated with 
the head of state.  
 Prominent French political scientists who advised the Moroccan throne, such as 
Maurice Duverger, devoted time to arguing for the new Moroccan constitution (Beling 1964, 
172).24 Another French jurist with strong ties to Morocco and Hassan II noted significant 
textual overlaps and similar chronological histories, both in the constitutions’ initial 
promulgation and in their subsequent revisions (Vedel 1993, 363-5). A contemporary 
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database comparing major structural features of the world’s constitutions finds significant 
similarities between France and Morocco in their high level of executive authority and their 
(correspondingly) low levels of parliamentary or legislative autonomy.25  
 De Gaulle’s brand of executive-centered politics was both a model familiar to the 
strongly Francophile Hassan II and an obvious (Western) template for a government centered 
on a strong ruler. If codifying monarchical advantage was Hassan’s purpose, then finding a 
familiar model that carried a strong flavor of global political legitimacy while, at the same 
time, translating Western institutional forms into Morocco’s institutional context was a 
sensible strategy. In fact, decades after the 1962 Constitution, Hassan II actually confessed 
that his constitution was inspired by the Fifth Republic, which, he argued, was a corrective to 
centuries of French political confusion as to the whether their executive or their legislature 
was supreme (Laurent 1993, 73-4). This also helps to explain the late king’s serial 
constitutionalism. While maintaining a strong executive, the Moroccan ruling cadre found 
that it could use constitutional redrafting to respond to social changes and demands for rights 
and pluralism in a manner that periodically fine-tuned the powers of a monarchical regime.  
 Early Moroccan constitutionalism was thus a case of direct if deliberately 
unacknowledged institutional borrowing from the 1958 French Fifth Republic’s basic law.26 
Yet the king and his constitutional advisors claimed inspiration, and borrowed, from a highly 
secularized French society—one in which the strong chief executive was elected through a 
contested democratic process. When Hassan II confessed that his constitution was inspired by 
the Fifth Republic,27 he went on to note that, although he had authoritarian tendencies, he had 
grounded his constitutional politics in the popular will of the people. In short, he used specific 
institutional models from a democratic state’s constitution to secure popular legitimacy for the 
underpinnings of an authoritarian monarchy. 
 In this context, the Moroccan system that borrowed from France’s constitution did so 
 
 
26 
in the explicit service of, and alongside detailed provisions for, a non-elected monarchy that 
established a state religion (Islam) from which it derived its popular legitimacy. Indeed, 
Morocco’s set of constitutions under Hassan II and, to only a slightly lesser extent, those 
introduced by his successor, Muhammed VI, clearly established the king as the hereditary 
embodiment and symbolic head of Islam. Accounts of Morocco’s constitutional identity and 
meaning stress these functions and procedures around the king’s codified status as the amir 
el-mu’minin (Benjelloun 2002). Indeed, while Hassan II was careful to deploy both secular 
and sacred legitimizing discourses, he stressed that his link to the population was one of 
“allegiance,” the Arabic term for which, bey’a, refers to a religio-political ceremony in which 
the country’s leaders pledge fealty to him as amir (Laurent 1993, 76).  
 Hassan II took language and specific institutional arrangements from France’s 
constitution out of their democratic and secular context in a deliberate effort to straddle the 
line between a European system and Morocco’s. Again, this was part of a broader political 
strategy that sought to maintain close ties to France while at the same time establishing 
Hassan, and the monarchy, as essential to Morocco because they fused a new nation-state 
with forms of traditional authority rooted in a religio-political lineage of ‘Alawi rulers. 
Hassan II’s father, Muhammed V, had emerged as the country’s pre-eminent political force 
and a major nationalist symbol during Morocco’s independence struggle. When Muhammad 
V died unexpectedly in 1961, his relatively unknown 32-year-old son Hassan II felt 
compelled to block the influence of competing nationalist parties like Istiqlal 
(“Independence”) and the more radically socialist and republican Union Nationale des Forces 
Populaires (UNFP) by reinforcing the historical and specifically religious salience of the 
monarchy.  
 The king’s consultation with prominent French constitutional scholars, and his 
appropriation of phrases and frameworks from the French constitution, thus served a political 
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purpose: demarcating Morocco under the monarchy as comparable to France—a “modern” 
state—whilst simultaneously pushing aside the secular Moroccan political parties jockeying 
for postcolonial power.28 In effect, the king’s resignification of French constitutional 
structures allowed him  to reference the trappings of European political legitimacy without 
simultaneously conceding to democratic or republican forms of power.   
 Within the Moroccan document, this recontextualization and re-signification of 
constitutional elements from France offered modern constitutional cover for direct 
monarchical links to religious history, effectively buttressing the political legitimacy of the 
king with rural and traditional Moroccans (Leveau 1976). Efforts to imbue the monarchy with 
quasi-sacred status also helped to justify the absence of any provisions for judicial review in 
the 1962 constitution (and subsequent constitutions under Hassan II), thus precluding any 
judicial reinterpretation of the king’s constitutional push to balance Western modernity with 
quasi-Islamic traditionalism. 
 Morocco’s constitutional system attaches the legalized status of a quasi-sacred 
monarchy to the political institutions of France’s Fifth Republic. This link has persisted 
through multiple Moroccan constitutions as well as a gradual expansion of non-monarchical 
institutional powers. What French drafters likely viewed as a set of institutional provisions 
concerning executive power serving the needs of a relatively centralized democratic secular 
order was carried over by Moroccan ruling elites as an “empty signifier” that was politically 
“re-signified” by a king and his advisors to amplify the authority of a non-elected monarchy 
imbued with quasi-religious power.  
 
Constitutional “Models” as Empty Signifiers: The Turkish Model in Post-Arab Spring Egypt  
 
A third pattern of empty-signifier-based borrowing involves invocations of foreign 
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constitutional models—without any explicit transfer of text—to mark out key positions in a 
domestic constitutional debate. After the Arab-Spring uprisings of 2011, Egyptians invoked 
Turkey’s constitutional model as a guide for a domestic political transition, but they did not 
adopt any Turkish constitutional text.  
 When the Turkish model was invoked by Arab publics demanding constitutional and 
political reform during and after the Arab Spring uprisings, the reference was generally 
linked to notions of sociopolitical “inclusiveness”—that is, the inclusion of Islamist political 
parties. With the governing Turkish AKP standing as a marker of this Islamist inclusion, such 
references regularly surfaced in the Egyptian press between the fall of 2011 and the end of 
2012 (Al-Masry al-Youm 3 July 2011). Specifically, the success of the AKP in Turkey’s 
national and local elections (2002 – 2011) created the impression that the Turkish republic’s 
history of assertive secularism had given way to a pluralist vision of democratic inclusion 
(Kuru 2013). In this sense, Turkey stood for a constitutional solution to one of the many 
problems faced by post-2011 Arab states—the problem of allowing more explicit Islamic 
political influence while, at the same time, striving for a stable democratic system. Reviewing 
the appeal of the Turkish model, one Cairo University professor cited the AKP’s ability to 
secure “democratic” stability under an “Islamic-oriented” ruling party (Nafaa 2011).  
 The notion that Turkey could serve as a model might have suggested that reformers 
would borrow directly from Turkey’s constitution. In fact, invocations of the Turkish model 
were offered by key figures directly involved in Egypt’s constitutional drafting process, 
including Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood politician who became Egypt’s first 
democratically elected president.29 When Morsi visited Turkey for an AKP convention in 
2012, he explicitly highlighted his admiration for the Turkish model even as the constitution-
drafting process led by his own party was still unfolding in Egypt (Dünya 1 October 2012). 
The specific meaning of the Turkish model, however, was slowly de-coupled from any 
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specific Turkish constitutional provisions; in fact, at one point, the idea that textual elements 
of the Turkish model could be transplanted or replicated was flatly rejected.30 None of the 
key players in Egypt’s constitutional debate—neither drafters (like Morsi) nor pundits nor the 
general public—sought to adopt specific provisions of the Turkish constitution. When the 
Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, traveled to Cairo in September 2011 and 
suggested that specific aspects of the Turkish model of secularism could be adopted in Egypt, 
the idea was rejected by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian officials 
who, in the past, had themselves invoked the merits of “the Turkish model.”31 
 Following the earliest invocations of the Turkish model in broader debates across the 
Arab world, Egyptian political figures expressed ambivalence about which aspects of the 
Turkish example might be worth emulating, particularly given the fact that Turkey’s actual 
constitution had been written under military tutelage in 1982 and amended over a dozen 
times. Typically, the success of the Turkish model was judged in light of perceptions 
regarding its political outcomes and, specifically, its outcomes in the realm of religion-state 
relations: on the one hand, Islamists who admired the ability of Turkey’s secular state to 
accommodate Islamist political parties; on the other, a more explicitly authoritarian 
appreciation for the ways in which Turkey’s military guarded the secular character of the 
state. Recalling Maximo Langer’s (2004, 33) description of legal translation owing to a 
struggle “between different actors and groups within the target legal system,” which of these 
elements was emphasized depended on the domestic interests of the Egyptian political actors 
who sought to embrace the “model” (Ottaway and Brown 2012).  
 While grassroots popular perceptions focused on the electoral successes of a 
moderately Islamist political party, non-Islamist elites tended to focus on the secular facets of 
Turkey’s political trajectory. Specifically, Egyptian military and business elites were less 
enamored of the post-2002 AKP model of Islamist inclusion than a pre-2002 model of 
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Turkish politics characterized by a strong and centralized executive.32 Indeed, even as 
President Morsi was praising the model as an important reference point for Islamist inclusion, 
prominent Arab columnists described the Egyptian military as adopting the Turkish model 
“to check Morsi” (Al-Monitor 15 June 2012).33 The Turkish model was, as such, an “empty 
signifier” with many possible meanings—indeed, a “surplus” of meaning. The specific 
content of its meaning, following Ernesto Laclau, emerged as a function of the political 
preferences of those who intervened to invoke it. 
 Of the various ways in which Turkey was invoked, however, the one that ultimately 
had the most influence in Egypt was the least inclusionary interpretation of what Turkey’s 
system represented. Specifically, an understanding of the Turkish model as according a 
preeminent role to the military in civilian governance was embraced by the leadership of the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) during Egypt’s post-uprising transition.34 The 
draft constitution adopted under the leadership of President Morsi in December 2012 did not 
reflect this version of the model, offering no formal tutelary role to the military in civilian 
governance. But, within six months, President Morsi was ousted in a military coup, and the 
constitution drafted during Egypt’s brief democratic interlude was abrogated then replaced 
(Brown and Dunne 2013). The new ruler, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, viewing Turkey as a 
major sponsor of the ousted Muslim Brotherhood, privileged a different version of the same 
Turkish “model” that radically curtailed Islamist political participation, giving the military a 
key role in defining the nature of Egyptian religion-state relations (Reuters 30 November 
2013; Al-Jazeera 8 March 2014).35 
 As an “empty signifier,” the Turkish model came to signal the legitimacy of 
(contradictory) Egyptian positions for the purpose of domestic political debate. In fact, 
invocations of the Turkish model served as a type of shorthand for the political positions 
taken by an array of drafters making divergent appeals to mobilize their domestic audiences. 
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In the end, the course of constitutional drafting in Egypt came to reflect the most 
exclusionary version of the Turkish model—a constitution drafted in the wake of a military 
coup to regulate religion-state relations through top-down imposition and, crucially, the 
exclusion of Islamist parties. 
 
Inheriting Empty Signifiers: The Ottoman Millet System from Inter-religious to Intra-religious 
Regulation in Israel  
 
Our fourth case study concerns the Ottoman Millet system of legal pluralism in the 
area of religious family law as it moved from the Ottoman Empire through the British 
Mandate to the quasi-constitutional architecture of Israel. This example differs from the 
preceding modes of constitutional movement in two key respects. First, it represents a case of 
constitutional inheritance from a prior legal system (common in postcolonial state-building) 
rather than any pro-active search for constitutional “imports” from other countries. Second, 
since Israel lacks a written constitution, this example illuminates some of the ways in which 
foreign models of religion-state relations might be assimilated via ordinary legislation. 
Legislation might be considered more flexible than formal constitutional provisions, but the 
basic regulatory structure of legal pluralism in Israel, inherited from the Millet system and 
adapted during the first few years of the state, remains largely unamended even after several 
decades. As such, we describe Israel’s regulation of marriage and divorce as “quasi-
constitutional.”36 Since the religious monopoly on marriage and divorce that emerged from 
Israel’s inheritance of the Ottoman Millet system has come to represent a core principle of 
religion-state relations in Israel, we use it to illuminate a pattern of constitutional assimilation 
and, then, constitutional re-signification.  
 The term “millet” emerged in the early-nineteenth century to designate recognized non-
Muslim communities living within the Ottoman Empire (Quataert 2005, 175-6). While 
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contemporary legal and political scholars often regard the Millet system as representing a 
highly pluralistic system of religious law, more recent historical research has emphasized the 
term’s versatility, which, already during Ottoman times, was influenced by centralizing reforms 
with a (Muslim) majoritarian flavor as well as external political pressures from Europe. Before 
the nineteenth century, different religious communities across the empire operated under 
distinct legal arrangements within the Ottoman state, with separate courts, judges, and legal 
principles. Following a set of mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms known as the Tanzimat 
reforms, however, a more centralized structure gradually replaced the empire’s differentiated 
legal system, culminating in 1917 with the publication of an Ottoman Family Code that was 
partly meant to unify family regulations on a territorial (rather than a religious or communal) 
basis (Agmon 2016-18).37 This new legislation, however, was never fully implemented due to 
the outbreak of WWI and, thereafter, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  
 When the British occupied Palestine, they generally preserved the system of 
differentiated religious tribunals, with some exceptions.38 Whilst claiming mere continuation of 
the Millet system, for instance, the British reversed emerging Ottoman reforms that strove for a 
more unified and territorially-based family code. Whereas under Ottoman rule Jews were free 
to appeal to Muslim courts, the British established an exclusive Rabbinical court defined as the 
sole religious authority for all of the Jews in Palestine. Moreover, the British recognized the 
1917 family code, which was developed by the Ottomans as a territorial state code, as a 
“Muslim Family Law” to be applied to Muslims alone, erasing all of the inclusive articles 
referring to Christians and Jews (Agmon 2016-18, 17-18).  
 With independence in May 1948, Israel’s Jewish leadership faced questions about the 
extent to which Ottoman or British family-law arrangements should be preserved or reformed. 
From the early stages of the debate, however, the dilemma was structured around intra-Jewish 
considerations initiating a further stage of legal “re-signification” surrounding the state’s 
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inherited Millet model. Israel’s new political leadership never seriously doubted the general 
Millet principle of legal pluralism, which allowed complete autonomy in the area of family law 
for all recognized religious communities. Still, intense debates took up the question of whether 
the Jewish rabbinical court established by the British mandate should retain its monopoly over 
family law for all Jewish citizens. (Non-Jews had limited representation in the Knesset and 
hardly participated in these debates regarding the “constitutional identity” of Israel as a Jewish 
state and whether it should be understood in religious or cultural/national terms.)  
 Ultimately, Israel’s “borrowing” of the Ottoman Millet model and its later re-
signification occurred in two stages. The first stage involved Israel’s first legislation, passed by 
the Provisional State Council in 1948, three days after independence, preserving the general 
contours of British Mandate law.39 The drafting of the Bill had begun even before 
independence, and the debate concerned the extent to which Jewish Law should be 
incorporated into state law (Radzyner 2010). During the first meeting of the Provisional 
Council (one day after independence) a representative of the Communist party criticized the 
Bill for its failure to separate the state from religion. But, within the Council, this claim 
represented a small minority.40 The final version of the Bill neither increased nor decreased the 
role of Jewish law compared with previous Mandate arrangements (Radzyner 2010).  
  Yet the application of a Millet-style system of legal pluralism in the context of a 
Jewish-majority state created new bureaucratic problems. Under both Ottoman and British rule, 
rabbinical courts could apply Jewish law only to those who were officially registered as 
members of the Jewish community. Because the State of Israel ceased to maintain such official 
registration, the question of official membership in the Jewish religion became extremely 
controversial. New legislation was required; and, in 1953, five years after independence, the 
government proposed the Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Tribunals (Marriage and Divorce) Bill, 
stirring intense political controversy.  
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 During Knesset debates on the proposed bill, Jewish religious parties claimed that a 
unified system of marriage and divorce amongst Israeli Jews, dictated by Halachic rule, would 
be essential to preserve a unified identity among the Jewish people. Otherwise, they argued, 
religious Jews would not be able to marry the descendants of those who had married without a 
ceremony according to Halachic provisions.41 In contrast, many in the majority secular/liberal 
camp argued against the bill’s failure to allow for civil or interfaith marriage.42 The Rabbinical 
Authority, it was argued, did not recognize gender equality and followed “medieval 
traditions.”43 Others opposed any infringement on “freedom of conscience,” arguing that the 
law would force non-religious citizens to act against their secular worldview.”44 Eventually, 
however, and despite this criticism, a majority of the Knesset led by Prime Minister David Ben 
Gurion and the Mapai Party voted for the 1953 Rabbinical Courts Act. This 1953 Law 
formalized a monopoly for the Orthodox rabbinate on personal-status laws regarding Jewish 
marriage and divorce even as it limited the scope of rabbinical authority with regard to other 
aspects of family law.45  
 Whereas the Millet system under Ottoman rule encouraged formal state recognition of 
diverse religious traditions and allowed various forms of religious self-governance, under 
Israeli law this inherited order was transmogrified into a centralizing mechanism of religious 
imposition and national homogenization for the state’s majority Jewish population. Rather than 
protecting religious minorities from potential abuse by the majority, the pluri-legal system of 
religious autonomies in the realm of marriage and divorce was refashioned—in part—to limit a 
right of marriage for certain parts of the population (including inter-faith couples) and to 
regulate intra-religious relations within the dominant (Jewish) community (Amir 2016).  
 Why would the secular/socialist leadership of the Mapai Party support such religious 
legislation, which conflicted with their personal commitment to religious freedom and 
entrenched an exclusivist resignification of the Millet system?46 Archival materials reveal that 
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the 1953 Law was part of a coalitional agreement within the Knesset between the Mapai 
majority and various religious parties.47 The two sides agreed to pass the Rabbinical Tribunals 
Bill hand in hand with another bill establishing a mandatory national service for religious 
women (in lieu of military service). Another consideration involved efforts to avoid conflicts 
with the more religious parts of world Jewry that might be expected to immigrate to Israel.48 
The records of the Mapai party and government meetings also reveal that many party members 
viewed the 1953 Rabbinical Courts Act as a temporary compromise; they did not intend to 
entrench religious personal-status regulations as a quasi-constitutional regulation for decades to 
come. Leading members of Mapai even explicitly raised the option of future reforms, including 
a civil marriage bill.49  
 Nevertheless, the bill played a central role in national debates regarding Israel’s 
“constitutional” identity. In the eyes of many, the rabbinical monopoly on marriage and divorce 
was designed to promote a homogenization of Jewish identity, on the one hand, while 
differentiating non-Jewish identities, on the other (Shafir and Peled 2002; Triger 2014; Gal 
2014). As such, the meaning of Israel’s inherited Millet system was actively translated and 
narrowed—from a policy protecting diversity and pluralism between religious groups to a 
centralized mechanism of religious homogenization targeting the members of Israel’s Jewish 
majority.  
 
CONCLUSION: POLITICS DRIVES TEXTUAL MEANING 
  
These four cases suggest the complex ways in which foreign constitutional provisions, 
institutions, and concepts are borrowed, invoked, or self-consciously inherited during 
constitution-drafting processes and then actively engaged during politically charged moments 
of constitutional contestation, re-interpretation, and translation. Our main argument is that, 
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well beyond the borrowing of constitutional “text,” the politics surrounding borrowed 
constitutional elements often shapes the meaning of those ideas and, therein, the significance 
of borrowing itself.  
 Constitutional borrowing, in this sense, is a political process that leaves room for local 
actors to introduce normative slippage, institutional adaptation, and new meaning. We do not 
see these new and narrower meanings as cases of “unsuccessful” borrowing.50 Instead, we 
see them as contested constitutional and political choices. As such, our focus on empty 
signifiers moves beyond the forms of organizational decision-making that feature in recent 
accounts of domestic legal translation (Edelman; Grattet) to examine explicitly transnational 
contexts of constitutional borrowing underpinned by explicitly political decision-making 
(Laclau).  
 Of course, not all cases of borrowing rely on empty signifiers. Where the meaning of 
a borrowed text or model is clearly bound by its prior usage (as in South African 
constitutional references to provisions of the International Covenant on Economic and Social 
Rights), it makes little sense to move beyond the notion of stable “privileged” signifiers to 
highlight the intervening influence of politically inflected “empty” signifiers (Young 2008-
09). As noted above, there is also a distinction to be drawn between the contested meanings 
we associate with empty signifiers and instances in which the meaning of a given text or 
norm is left deliberately “floating” or vague, as in persistent Indian debates regarding the 
meaning of a constitutional principle like “secularism” or the refusal, by Léopold Sengohr 
and later politicians and judges in Senegal, to define an important constitutional term like 
“laïc” (Sen 2010; Diagne 2017).  
 In all four of the cases we examine, domestic political dynamics explain the shifting 
meaning of constitutional empty signifiers. In Pakistan, domestic legislators and judges 
shaped the meaning of both Irish and Indian constitutional provisions regarding religious 
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freedom in ways that became more closely tied to forms of parliamentary majoritarianism 
and a cynical effort to bind Pakistan’s “Muslim” community together via forms of 
juxtaposition vis-à-vis the country’s Ahmadi minority. In Morocco, domestic political elites 
underpinned the re-signification of French constitutional provisions in ways closely tied to 
the codification of quasi-religious monarchical advantage against domestic political 
challengers. In Egypt, the political underpinnings of the so-called “Turkish model” harbored 
a surplus of meaning that pointed in two directions at once—towards bottom-up forms of 
Islamist political inclusion as well as top-down forms of secular authoritarianism—with the 
latter coming to prevail, via the military coup of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, after 2013. In 
Israel, core political dynamics underpinned a shift in the meaning of a quasi-constitutional 
personal-law system inherited from the Ottoman Empire via the British mandate. This system 
was reframed by Jewish political leaders to advance their goals regarding both inter-religious 
and intra-religious relations in the realm of marriage and divorce. With reference to borrowed 
constitutional provisions in the realm of religion-state relations, further research will 
undoubtedly help to isolate the mechanisms that drive politically inflected patterns of “re-
signification”, not only in the direction of religious exclusion, but also, at least potentially, in 
the direction of greater inclusion.  
 Centering our analysis on the active importers of constitutional concepts, rather than 
exporters,51 our study challenges trends highlighting the degree to which travelling constit-
utional texts might point to global constitutional isomorphism or convergence. Constitutional 
borrowing, we argue, is closely tied to the idiosyncratic political circumstances surrounding 
the deliberate choices of importers—to provide political signals, borrow symbolic capital, or 
invoke patterns of domestic constitutional legitimacy—without any associated commitment 
to reproducing the “original” meaning of a particular constitutional text, institution, or idea. 
Grasping the subtleties of local political contestation, we argue, is essential for those with an 
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interest in illuminating the conceptual modulations that underpin the meaning of borrowed 
constitutional texts.  
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1 Different terms may be used to reference the same phenomenon, including constitutional 
“appropriation,” “cross-pollination,” “transplantation,” and “transfer.” We distinguish 
structural processes of constitutional “diffusion” from agent-driven processes of “borrowing”. 
2 See also Chen-Wishart 2013: “[w]here [a] law evolved in one society is parachuted into 
another society, the result may range along the entire spectrum or continuum between 
rejection and smooth reception.”  
3 On the politics of shifting meaning, see also Örücü 2002. 
4 This literature is vast; for leading examples see Choudhry 2002 and Hirschl 2014.  
5 On Watson v. Legrand debates, see Cohn 2010 and Cairns 2013.  
6 On state-based translations of indigenous laws, and indigenous translations of state-based 
institutions, processes, or statutes, see for example Cohn 1961 and Nader 1989.  
7 On diffusion and diverse forms of legal practice, see also Hans 2017. 
8 Scheppele notes that drafters borrow and reject foreign examples; we offer a more 
systematic approach to the non-binary politics of borrowing. 
9 Both Grattet and Edelman work at the intersection of ordinary and constitutional law in 
domestic settings; whereas Edelman focuses on civil anti-discrimination laws and 
constitutional notions of “equality,” Grattet focuses on hate-crime laws and constitutional 
protections for “conscience,” “speech,” “equal protection,” and “due process.” See Edelman 
(1992, 2011); Phillips and Grattet (2000); Grattet and Jenness (2005). 
10 On “liberal” struggles to address the diversity of customary spiritual practices in India, see 
Mani 1998 and Chatterjee 2010. 
11 On British colonial encounters with diverse “Hindu” customs, see Baird 2005. 
12 Like Edelman and Rykett, Salam 2018 examines sub-constitutional rather than 
constitutional engagements; but, again, he describes cases in which external (human-rights) 
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ideas matter even when they cannot be seen at the level of the (Islamic) juridical texts that 
incorporate them.  
13 British India’s Government of India Act (1935), which laid the foundation for much of 
Pakistan’s CA debates, did not enumerate fundamental rights. These rights were transplanted 
from anti-colonial Ireland and India. 
14 The Constitution Commission that drafted Pakistan’s second Constitution under General 
Ayub Khan (1962) recommended retaining Articles 10 and 11 (from India). When Khan 
relegated these rights to a set of (nonjusticiable) ‘Principles of Law-Making’, enormous 
protests prompted a speedy reversal (1963); see Braibanti 1965. In Pakistan’s third 
Constitution (1973), Articles 10 and 11 were renumbered as Articles 20(a) and 20(b). 
15 On the introduction of Pakistan’s “Muslim” head of state, see Binder 1961, 121-23. On the 
introduction of a separate “non-Muslim” electorate, see CA Debates, 19 April 1952, 220. 
16 Binder 1961, 293 cites Dawn newspaper reports 9-12 January 1953. 
17 Pakistan’s 1st Amendment recognized the sovereign state of Bangladesh.  
18 See Qasmi 2014, 178-84 citing Proceedings of the Special Committee 1974.  
19 See Qasmi 2014, 193 citing Proceedings of the Special Committee 1974, 74. 
20 Morocco’s late King Hassan II supervised the promulgation of new constitutions in 1962, 
1970, 1972 and 1992; King Muhammed VI responded to the Arab Uprisings with a new 
constitution in 2011. 
21 Beling 1964 (172n27) citing New York Times 19 November 1962. 
22 Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution begins, “When the institutions of the Republic, 
the integrity of its territory… are threatened… the President takes measures expected under 
the circumstances.” The article allows for a state of exception in consultation with the Prime 
Minister and Parliamentary heads. Article 35 of the 1962 Moroccan Constitution begins, 
“When the integrity of national territory is threatened… the King can, after having consulted 
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with the presidents of the two (Parliamentary) chambers…, proclaim… a state of exception” 
(translations from French and Arabic by David Mednicoff). 
23 See Article 11 (France) and Article 26 (Morocco). 
24 Duverger’s role is also noted in Gallagher 1963, 5. 
25 See similar rankings on legislative power and judicial independence (low) and executive 
power (high) at <http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ccp-rankings/> 
26 This borrowing is acknowledged by Moroccan law professors Aziz Hasbi and Saïd Ihrai in 
Basri, Rousset, and Vedel 1993, 34-43. 
 
28 Georges Vedel was a frequent consultant and constitutional cheerleader for Hassan II, even 
commenting on the similarities between successive French and Moroccan constitutions; see 
Basri, Rousset, and Vedel 1993, 363-91. 
29 Ties between Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s AKP were addressed before and 
after Morsi’s ouster in 2013; see Campion and Bradley 2011 and Kader 2013.  
30 See Nafaa 2011, 37: “the AKP’s experience in Turkey [i]s a ‘success story’ that may be 
inspiring to the Arab peoples at this … stage in their history, but not necessarily as a model 
that can be transferred and replicated.” 
31 “Erdogan, in Cairo, Touts Turkey as Model for Arab World,” Associated Press, 15 
September 2011 (noting that Erdogan “fueled debate … on whether the Turkish model was 
really applicable [in Egypt]” and that “Amr Shobaki, a columnist for … Al-Masry Al-Youm, 
wrote that while Egypt can’t copy Turkey it should be ‘inspired’ by its experience”), 
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